Enabling individually entrusted routing security for open and decentralized community networks by Neumann, Axel et al.
Enabling Individually Entrusted Routing Security for Open and Decentralized Community
Networks
Axel Neumanna, Leandro Navarroa, Llorenç Cerdà-Alaberna
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Abstract
Routing in open and decentralized networks relies on cooperation. However, the participation of unknown nodes and node admin-
istrators pursuing heterogeneous trust and security goals is a challenge. Community-mesh networks are good examples of such
environments due to their open structure, decentralized management, and ownership. As a result, existing community networks
are vulnerable to various attacks and are seriously challenged by the obligation to find consensus on the trustability of participants
within an increasing user size and diversity. We propose a practical and novel solution enabling a secured but decentralized trust
management. This work presents the design and analysis of securely-entrusted multi-topology routing (SEMTOR), a set of routing-
protocol mechanisms that enable the cryptographically secured negotiation and establishment of concurrent and individually trusted
routing topologies for infrastructure-less networks without relying on any central management. The proposed mechanisms have
been implemented, tested, and evaluated for their correctness and performance to exclude non-trusted nodes from the network. Re-
spective safety and liveness properties that are guaranteed by our protocol have been identified and proven with formal reasoning.
Benchmarking results, based on our implementation as part of the BMX7 routing protocol and tested on real and minimal (Open-
WRT, 10 Euro) routers, qualify the behaviour, performance, and scalability of our approach, supporting networks with hundreds of
nodes despite the use of strong asymmetric cryptography.
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1. Introduction
Community mesh networks [1, 2, 3] are ideally open and de-
centralized structures, growing and evolving organically as net-
work infrastructure is contributed, deployed, and configured by
their participants. Typically, a deployment of such networks,
such as Guifi.net [4] with more than 34,000 total active nodes,
is structured in different network clouds [5], each consisting
of up to hundreds of nodes, constituting autonomous systems
(AS), operating its cloud-specific internal routing protocol (e.g.
OSPF and, OLSR), and peering with neighbouring clouds via
an exterior gateway protocol (e.g. BGP).
The operation of such networks is based on the principle of
cooperation among the members. These communities usually
have participation rules, such as a membership licence or peer-
ing agreement [6, 7, 8], that define their freedom, openness and
neutrality. Nonetheless, current designs and implementations
of mesh networks impose comprehensive technical definitions
and restrictions to achieve functional data transit and end-to-
end delivery among any pair of network nodes [2]. That in-
cludes the use of a specific routing protocol and routing metric
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so that nodes can consistently learn and inform about the state
of the network and update their own routing tables. In practice,
due to the lack of mature implementations, only a very few of
the proposed routing protocols are used in real deployments or
have been experimentally analyzed [3, 9, 10, 11]. Among them
there are the AODV [12, 13], Babel [14, 15], BMX6 [16], the
widely used OLSR [17, 18, 19], and batman-adv [20] protocol
implementations.
One shortcoming of the current solutions is given by the lack
of routing-security support that comes without introducing cen-
tralized dependencies (e.g. certificate authorities) [21], which
would contradict with the open and the decentralized objectives
of such networks. Another problem lies in the protocol require-
ments for unified parametrization of metrics and policies to de-
termine Quality of Service (QoS), routing, trust and security
decisions for all network nodes [22]. Such a strong level of uni-
fication prohibits the usage of individually defined policies and
limits its openness. It also imposes a substantial effort, increas-
ing with the number and diversity of community members, for
finding consensus on related questions.
To dilute the limitations of a single and unified set of QoS
parameters for routing, QoS multi-topology (MT) routing has
been proposed [23, 24], allowing the concurrent support of mul-
tiple virtual topologies (on top of a single physical topology),
each established based on a different definition of QoS param-
eters. In OLSRv2 [19] MT is used for routers to support more
than one link metric type. In this paper we use the MT con-
cept to concurrently support different security and trust sets. A
network could for example maintain one topology (a) for nodes
trusted by organization A, and a second topology (b) usable
only by nodes certified via organization B.
The security design of the protocol proposed in this work en-
sures that each node is the only authority able to define and
publish its set of individually trusted nodes based on which
forwarding rules (routes) for delivering its traffic should be se-
lected, propagated, and maintained. This way, our protocol pur-
sues the MT approach as it establishes dedicated virtual topolo-
gies for each participating node. It further supports the coop-
erative, open, and decentralized philosophy that enables com-
munity networking, as deployed network infrastructures remain
open for other nodes to join and be used while being indepen-
dent from any central entity.
This paper extends [25] the initial design and analysis of
the securely-entrusted multi-topology routing (SEMTOR) pro-
tocol. In summary, the main contributions of this work are:
• Propose novel, secured, and decentralized routing protocol
mechanisms called SEMTOR. With SEMTOR users can
define individual trust sets of nodes, which are the only
ones allowed to route their traffic.
• Summarize the assumptions, and respectively achieved
safety and liveness properties and prove their correctness
with formal reasoning.
• Describe how SEMTOR is implemented in BMX7 by ex-
tending BMX6 (BMX6 + SEMTOR = BMX7), a routing
protocol currently used in production community wireless
mesh networks [5].
• Experimental validation of the resistance of the SEMTOR
implementation to various attack vectors and challenging
network scenarios.
• Analysis of the performance and resource requirements of
SEMTOR by measuring traffic, CPU, and memory over-
head. The results demonstrate the scalability of SEMTOR
to support existing mesh-network deployments and using
inexpensive off-the-shelf WiFi hardware.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After
reviewing related work in Section 2, we identify the addressed
problems and design objectives in Section 3 and detail the sys-
tem model with further assumptions and definitions in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 describes the design and mechanisms of our
protocol to solve these objectives which is then validated from
an formal and an experimental perspective in Section 6.3 and
7. This includes the presentation of our prototypical implemen-
tation and its functional and performance evaluation using em-
bedded router hardware in a virtualized network environment.
We discuss the contributions, open issues, and adjacent security
solution in Section 8 and conclude in Section 9.
2. Background and Related Work
Existing work on secure routing for ad hoc and mesh net-
works has been reviewed in [26, 27]. Authenticated routing for
ad hoc networks (ARAN) [28] as proposed by Sanzgiri et al.
and admittance-control enabling extensions for OLSRv2 pro-
posed by Herberg et al. [29] use digital signatures to verify
the authenticity and integrity of control messages. Both rely
on the existence of a central certificate server trusted by all
participating nodes. Babel hash-based message authentication
code (HMAC) cryptographic authentication [30] relies on one
or several pre-deployed shared keys to validate messages via at-
tached message authentication codes (MAC). However, the re-
quirement for preserving shared keys as a private secret within
an open network community disqualifies related approaches for
any open Community Network (CN).
In addition, SEAD [31] and SAODV [32] encounter the
dependency on a central trust authority with a self-securing
control plane. Using Anchored Hash Chains (AHCs) to protect
the mutable hop counter field of routing- update messages
they ensure that a malicious node cannot claim better distances
to any remote node than it really has. However, both remain
vulnerable to data-plane attacks such as packet dropping or
routing-table poisoning. Moreover, SAODV proposes the use
of digital signatures to protect non-mutable data in routing
messages. To avoid the dependency of a certification authority
as a central root of trust that guarantees the binding between
node public keys (nodePKs) and other node properties such as
their IP address Zapata [33] proposed to bind the identity of
nodes given by their public key to their allocated address by
building it based on the hash of the public key.
Work in [34] and [35] addressed the problem of misbehaving
nodes by punishing malicious nodes based on their forward-
ing behaviour as observed and assessed by neighbouring nodes.
Adnane et al. [34] build on top of SOLSR and extend it with
detection and reaction mechanisms. Mogre et al. [35] present
another holistic approach combining self-securing routing, de-
tection, reputation, and counter-measure mechanisms.
Introduced in [25], SEMTOR follows a different approach.
In fact, guaranteeing in all aspects the correct operation of
nodes is indeed hard and, as pointed out by Adnane et al. [34],
cannot be guaranteed (e.g. data-plane attacks cannot be pre-
vented) by securing the topological information exchanged be-
tween nodes. Therefore, instead of aiming to ensure or enforce
correct operation, SEMTOR enables each node admin to freely
define their individual subset (and resulting sub-topology) from
the complete set of participating nodes that the admin considers
sufficiently trustworthy to meet the security and data-delivery
objectives and concerns. In addition, none of the presented
work relying on asymmetric cryptography for verification of
control messages has yet been analyzed in terms of perfor-
mance or benchmarked based on embedded hardware and ex-
posed to traffic and network characteristics that are typical for
existing community mesh-network clouds. An overview of re-
lated work on routing security for IP-based mesh networks is
given in Table 1.
An impressive amount of further related research about wire-
less mesh networks has been done in recent years. Selected
publications are ordered thematically with respect to the im-
portance for the objectives of this work. The case of commu-
nity mesh networks is discussed in terms of legal implications,
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OLSRv2 ext. [29] centralized CA signed CA trust CA trust * proactive, link state × simulation
Babel HMAC [30] orchestrated shared key group trust group trust * proactive, DSDV X ×
ARAN [28] centralized CA signed consistent CA trust RTT reactive × simulation
SEAD [31] open AHC consistent insecure HC proactive, DSDV × simulation
SAODV [32, 33] open self-signed, AHC consistent insecure HC reactive, DSDV X ×
VRR [36] open self-signed consistent insecure VRR,* hybrid, SR, DHT X sim., testbed
Trust OLSR [34] open signed reputation punishment detection * proactive, link state × simulation
AntSec [35] centralized CA-signed punishment detection probabil. proactive, stigmergic × simulation
CONFIDANT [37] open PGP reputation punishment detection * reactive, DSR × simulation




trusted * proactive, DSDV X CN realistic
motivation, design, and business models in [39, 40, 1, 7, 41,
42, 21]. In addition, scalability and performance aspects of
routing protocols are handled in [43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 9].
Trust and security related work is surveyed and discussed in
[49, 27, 50, 51, 52], with solutions for particular routing func-
tions in [53, 34, 54, 31, 37, 55, 56, 57], and presentations of
holistic security frameworks in [36, 37, 58, 35, 59]. The last
four also present measurement results based on simulation. Ap-
proaches towards supporting different or user-defined routing
policies are handled in [22, 60]. Traffic validation, or how to
recognize a misbehaving path, node or link and which infor-
mation is needed, is addressed by sketches [61, 62, 63, 64],
counters [65], fingerprinting [66] or sampling [62]. Distributed
detection, the assessment of anomalous and faulty nodes based
on sharing of distributed observations, considering the arbitrary
behaviour of malicious nodes, is addressed by Π2 and Πk+2 [67]
in general, or by KDet [68], which is specifically for CNs.
3. Problem Statement
The goal of SEMTOR is to provide secure mechanisms to
ensure that non-trusted nodes in an open network are effectively
prevented from disrupting the routing between trusted nodes.
In multi-hop mesh networks, end-to-end routing is a dis-
tributed task that relies on the contribution of network resources
by nodes and honest collaboration between them. However, in
an open network, this allows new or unknown nodes to join
without pre-conditions. Therefore, malicious or misconfigured
nodes with byzantine behaviour can participate and interfere
with the collaboration with faulty operations or adverse contri-
butions. As such, the routing system is one of the most complex
and fragile but, unfortunately, also one of the least protected
components in a network infrastructure [51].
In such a hostile environment, our mechanism shall ensure
that routing-related tasks such as path detection, (efficient and
consistent) route establishment, and end-to-end packet forward-
ing are robust against any faulty operations from non-trusted
nodes.
With reference to the work of Mizrak et al. [67], the prob-
lem of detecting and handling compromised nodes in a network
can be split into the three sub-problems: (i) local traffic vali-
dation: traffic behaviour characterization based on local obser-
vation, (ii) distributed detection: assessment of anomalous and
faulty nodes based on sharing of distributed observations, and
(iii) response: enforcing the exclusion of a given set of identi-
fied faulty nodes.
In that sense, our protocol addresses the third sub-problem of
a response. More precisely, given a known subset of faulty or
distrusted nodes (from the overall set of existing nodes), how
can we ensure that no subset of these nodes can negatively af-
fect any routing-critical task? The other two sub-problems of
traffic validation and distributed detection are out of the scope
of this work, but there are complementary solutions suitable
for this scenario with sketches [64] for the first problem, and
KDet [68] for the second. Further, no assumptions are made
on how a required subset of trusted nodes (or its relative com-
plement from the set of overall nodes, the set of non-trusted
nodes) is obtained. It is just taken for granted, as each commu-
nity mesh-network can implement its own way to produce and
maintain these lists.
3.1. Objectives
For the design of the protocol, the following four objectives
have been identified and are briefly summarized as follows.
Regarding ownership of data traffic, forwarding routes, and
node identities, the objective is that any CN-related routing-
table entry and packet can be attributed to exactly one node of
the network. Each node can be unambiguously identified with
a secure identity and an identity-proving address. In addition,
each node is the exclusive owner of exactly those routes point-
ing towards this address and those packets carrying this address
as destination.
Regarding security in terms of autonomy and robustness,
the general objective is that any contiguous group of nodes
(node admins), trusting and willing to cooperate and support
each other, can not be prevented by an external entity (e.g. an
adversary) from doing so.
Regarding openness and decentralization, the objective is
that each node admin can individually decide which of the other
nodes to trust and rely on, that multiple cooperative groups of
nodes (admins) can coexist, that group membership is not ex-
clusive, and that there is no need for a central registry or au-
thority. Nonetheless, similar to social networking or so-called
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networks of trust, public-key servers or other decentralized co-
ordination platforms may be used to facilitate the management
of known and trustable nodes and corresponding node IDs.
Regarding scalability, an implementation of the proposed
mechanisms should be feasible and scalable for the character-
istics (e.g., number of nodes and links per node) of typical CN
clouds and given the resource limitations (e.g., CPU, memory,
and bandwidth) of low-budget but state-of-the-art embedded
routers used in today’s CN deployments.
4. System Model
4.1. Community Model
Figure 1 illustrates the key scenarios, assumptions, and char-
acteristics that are consistent with real-world community-mesh-
network clouds. Mesh clouds typically incorporate up to thou-
sands of users, hundreds of mesh nodes, and tens of links per
node [69, 70, 71, 72, 73] and can extend from a small neigh-
bourhood to the coverage of a city or rural district. They inter-
connect via gateways with neighbouring community clouds and
other private or public networks, such as the Internet.
The technical enablers are given by nodes based on wire-
less or wired router hardware [3] with usually limited storage,
bandwidth, and computation capabilities. These nodes are con-
tributed and controlled by individuals and mounted at low cost
on rooftops or isolated rural locations powered by solar en-
ergy. The links, manually or automatically established between
neighbouring nodes, create a restricted-route network without
universal direct connectivity between all mesh nodes [74, 75].
As such, the overall infrastructure is owned, developed, and
maintained by its users, who are united by the common idea
to share their networking resources: They offer the service pro-
vided by their own routing hardware and links to others and
benefit from those offered by others.
Users can be grouped into two stakeholder groups: users of
the infrastructure and administrators that take the additional
responsibility to control and maintain individual nodes (mesh
routers) and other locally connected infrastructure such as con-
tent servers or border gateways to neighbouring networks.
Due to the different roles, a local trust relation exists between
the directly connected users of a node and its representative, the
node administrator who implements the local user decisions. It
is expected that such local node communities are rather small
(typically at the scale of a house or organization) so that con-
sensus on commons such as a licence or terms of usage (e.g.,
[6, 7, 8]) can be reached via direct communication. However,
if consensus is impossible, an independent local node deploy-
ment, implementing a different usage policy, can be set up, such
as the case for the upper right building in Figure 1, which hosts
two nodes operated by different administrators.
Because of the implicit dependence on each network com-
ponent being potentially involved in the cooperative task of
routing and traffic forwarding, the usage of existing resources
should not be imposed and the ability to select and disapprove
among the overall set of existing cloud resources is important.
However, for an open and decentralized CN that brings together
individuals and organizations with different and even conflict-
ing economic, political, and technical interests [76, 1, 77] and
that can not prevent anybody from participating also with noto-
riously error-prone or even malicious configured equipment, the
achievement of global consensus on the trustability of all other
participating nodes and their administrators is actually impos-
sible. Instead, it is expected that controversy exists and trusta-
bility is only given among various subsets of the overall user
groups. Such directed trust relations between admins are ex-
emplary and are illustrated as green arrows for users of admin E
and F. The E users agreed on accepting the licence and trusting
in the administrative setup of A, C, and F, while admin F and
its connected users trust in B, D, and E.
4.2. Network Model and Terminology
This section introduces the terminology and assumptions
used for specifying and justifying the SEMTOR approach for
enabling node admins (as modelled in Section 4.1) to individu-
ally specify trusted nodes so that all non-trusted nodes can not
interfere.
A network node is defined as a (routing) process owning
an individual public/private key pair to support cryptographic
operations for authentication, integrity-verification, and non-
repudiation of data created by the node. The private key is as-
sumed to be permanent, globally unique, and accessible exclu-
sively by the key-owning node. A node is supposed to correctly
perform the tasks of path detection, route establishment, and
forwarding of IP data-packets as specified by algorithms and
implemented by a specification-conforming routing protocol.
A supposedly correct (benign) node may indeed not conform
with the specification of correct behaviour. This may be due
to accidental mis-configuration or malicious motivation of the
person administering this node. The public key of a node X is
denoted as K pubX . An identity function VX = v(K
pub
X ) is an injec-
tive function that assigns a label (identity) VX to node X based
on K pubX . A practical identity function v(N) such as the secure
SHA224 [78] hash function is assumed for this work. The set
of all (correctly and incorrectly behaving) nodes is given as V.
A link EB,A describes a directed connection that exists if a
network interface of node VB is in direct transmission range of
a network interface of VA and vice versa, providing a function-
ing bidirectional transmission opportunity between VA and VB.
However, while the existence of EB,A implies the existence of
EA,B it does not imply that these two links are symmetric or
even identical: EB,A , EA,B. If more than one network interface
per node is assumed then EB,A shall represent the best of all
possible combination of links for transmitting from VA to VB.
The set of all existing links between all nodes is given as E.
A path PT,S is a sequence of nodes Vh ∈ V with 0 ≤
h ≤ s, s ≥ 1 so that with VT ≡ V0 and VS ≡ Vs the path
PT,S = {V0,V1,V2, ...Vs−1,Vs} explicitly identifies a particular
sequence of nodes (connected via implicitly identified links
E0,1, E1,2, ..., Es−1,s between consecutive nodes) from source
node VS to destination node VT within G, providing a directed
end-to-end transmission path with h = {0, 1, 2, ..., s − 1, s} rep-
resenting the number of remaining hops (nodes) from Vh to
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Figure 1: Model of a community mesh network
VT ≡ V0. The set of all possible paths for a given graph G
and (VT ,VS )-tuple is denoted as PT,S with PT,S ∈ PT,S .
Path detection denotes the task of identifying and maintain-
ing, for a given network topology G and VT ,VS -tuple, existing
paths and path metrics so that identified (VT ,VS )-paths could
be differentiated and ranked.
Route establishment denotes the task of leveraging informa-
tion from the path detection for setting up IP routing tables so
that continuous and consistent forwarding paths are established
between any tuple of source and destination nodes.
Forwarding denotes the task of forwarding and eventually
delivering IP-data packets according to previously established
routes from a source to a destination node.
Routing processes exchange routing update messages with
neighboring nodes and therefore rely on the following assump-
tions and service primitives provided by the data-link layer:
• The network connectivity over time is given by the topol-
ogy graph G during interval I.
• Links of G either exist (are up) or not (are down) and their
states do not change within one particular interval In.
• tx(d): The transmit function broadcasts data d to all
neighbouring nodes to which a link from the broadcasting
node exists.
• rx(d): The receive function receives data d broadcasted by
any node from which a link to the receiving node exists.
• The maximum transmission delay υ between any tx(d)
function call and corresponding rx(d) events is much
smaller than interval I: υ  I
4.3. Threat Model and Assumptions
A threat is defined as a potential for disruption of route estab-
lishment or forwarding services towards a destination. Threat
sources are given by adversaries motivated to disrupt this ser-
vice and possessing the capabilities to violate the attack sur-
face of routing processes. This attack surface is given by the
exchange of protocol messages used to interact with their en-
vironment which could be created, modified, or treated in an
unexpected manner.
In the following, adversaries are modelled as a class of net-
work nodes. As such, the behaviour of a network node VY re-
garding another particular node VX is either correct (benign)
and complies with the protocol rules regarding VX or it is ad-
verse (malicious) and performs arbitrary behaviour (byzantine)
regarding VX that, detectable or not, deviates from the proto-
col rules. The set of correct nodes regarding VX is given as
VcX . The set of adverse nodes regarding VX is given as V
c
X with
VcX = V \ V
c
X .
Unless otherwise precluded, no assumptions are made on the
methodologies and behaviour applied by adversaries to achieve
their objectives. In particular, no assumptions are made on the
point of time (which may be any time in the future) and the
extent of deviation (which may happen at the control or data
plane), collaboration (allowing coordinated and distributed at-
tack), or communication capabilities (using extraordinary and
dedicated channels) of adversaries. The following assumptions
apply to all nodes (including adversaries).
Assumption 1. Nodes cannot tamper with cryptographic prim-
itives.
This means nodes cannot attack fundamental cryptographic
primitives and their key properties such as those given by a se-
cure hash function, the asymmetric encryption and decryption,
signing and signature verification based on a public-private key
pair, the Diffie-Hellmann (DH) secure key-exchange, and a the
identity and ownership proving properties provided by a Cryp-
tographically Generated Addresss (CGAs). Nodes cannot con-
trol other nodes beyond the specified protocol rules. In particu-
lar private key material is inaccessible to other nodes, and other
node services (e.g. ssh) are sufficiently secured.
Assumption 2. Nodes cannot launch a wormhole attack [79]
without being detected and without corresponding packets be-
ing discarded by the receiving node.
This implies that it is impossible to replay entire packets
without changing them so that they appear to the receiving
nodes as being received directly from the node that originated
the repeated packet in the first place. Such attack can be ad-
dressed by lower protocol layers, Phy or medium access-control
(MAC), via packet leashes [80] or NPAs [81], or by higher level
distributed detection [82].
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Table 2: Summary of used symbols
Symbol Description Properties
V set of all nodes (correct or not)
K pubX public key of node X





X ) particular node X labeled as VX VX ∈ V
AX = a(VX) IPv6 crypto-address (CGA) of VX
tx(d) tx function broadcasting data d to all
neighbours
rx(d) rx function receiving broadcasted data
d from neighbour
ct , cr arbitrary transmitted or received mes-
sage code, e.g. c ∈ {ping, pong, ...}
I interval between two points of time
S X,d =
s(K privX , d)




s(K pubX , S , d) signature verification function s :
{K, S , d} →
{ f alse, true}






AX ,VtX ,MX , fX}
unsigned description components of
node VX with sequence number Q =
QdX




signed description of DcX,Q
QdX description sequence number of DX,Qd Q
d ∈ N+
QaX,Q AHC anchor of DX,Q









heartbeat sequence number of VX Qh ∈ N+
VcX set of all correct nodes regarding VX





VtX set of all nodes trusted by VX





E set of all links between all nodes
EB,A particular directed link from VA to VB EB,A , EA,B
, EB,A ∈ E
EtX set of all links trusted by VX (see eq. (6))
LB,A = l(EB,A) directional link-metric quality for trans-
mitting from A to B
L ∈ R+
MT,S = m(VT ,
VS , fT , M̂T )
path-metric quality from VS to VT
depending on VT -defined customizer
function f and upper quality bound M̂T
M ∈ R+ ,
M ≤ M̂





trusted topology graph of VX
PT,S =
{V0,V1, ...,Vn}
particular explicit path from VS to VT as
ordered list of connected nodes V ∈ V
from G with V0 ≡ VS ,Vn ≡ VS
PT,S set of all directed paths from VS to VT
PtT,S set of paths trusted by VT from VS to
VT
PtT,S ⊆ PT,S
PcT,S set of paths consisting only of correct
nodes regarding VT from VS to VT
PcT,S ⊆ PT,S
Pt,cT,S set of paths consisting only of trusted








established route from VS to destination
VT along implicitly defined nodes
Assumption 3. Nodes cannot perform anonymous denial of
service (DoS) attacks.
Nodes cannot perform DoS attacks by exhausting processing
capacities (in terms of memory or CPU) of neighbouring nodes
without being detected as the cause of the critical resource ex-
haustion and their packets being discarded. Network and traffic
monitoring and detection can detect and mitigate these attacks.
Assumption 4. Nodes cannot physically disturb other nodes.
This means that wireless channels cannot be disturbed via
jamming, and traffic incurred by concurrent transmissions shar-
ing the same local channel environment have only a marginal
effect on the remaining capacity of the affected links.
All these assumptions are applicable to community mesh net-
works and, to the best of our knowledge, actually to any dis-
tributed networking service aiming at some sort of end-to-end
data forwarding and delivery while relying on a limited set of
resources. Cryptographic primitives can (and have been) based
on considered secure standard work such as SHA2 hashes, RSA
and HMAC signatures, and Diffie-Hellman key exchange. If
one of these primitives prove to be insecure in the future, they
can be replaced. Vulnerability of nodes to physical (destruc-
tion or jamming), (distributed) denial of service, or wormhole
attacks are kind of obvious issues and cannot be prevented en-
tirely unless the whole network is placed in mechanically and
frequency shielded environments or based on quantum commu-
nication which is currently unfeasible for any open community
network. Related issues and solutions are discussed in sec-
tion 8.
5. Protocol Design
The basic idea to achieve our objectives may be best illus-
trated with a simple example: If person x declared that he/she
fully trusts persons a and b, then any person y, that knows
about the declaration of x, could hand out a value for x to a
or b while fully respecting x’s assumptions of trust and know-
ing x as being in full charge of this action and any subsequent
consequences. Further, these trust declarations should not be
weakened by composition (intransitive). In the above example,
intransitive means that even if a or b assume (and declared) z
to be trusted, they must not hand out any value for x to z un-
less also x explicitly declared z as trusted. Applying this idea to
routing in IP networks, a person is represented by a node that
uses a routing protocol to communicate the declaration of its
administrator.
SEMTOR extends the concept of receiver-driven routing
[22] (allowing nodes to express path-selection preferences via
a descriptive profile) and the principles of table-driven, proac-
tive, destination-sequenced distant-vector (DSDV) routing [83]
(where sequenced routing updates, originated by each node of a
network and updated and re-broadcasted by each hop, are used
to propagate path cost and versioning information in the net-
work). In contrast to the traditional DSDV protocol, containing
IP address and sequence number to identify a particular node
of the network and a specific version of its update, the routing
update of SEMTOR contains a single and verifiable heartbeat
value which unambiguously identifies a particular node of the
network and a specific version of this node’s self-defined de-
scription and routing-update version.
The concepts and relations between node identities, descrip-
tions, and heartbeats are described in the following sections. A
more detailed description is given in [38].
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5.1. Global Node Identification and Description
A strong and permanent node-public key (nodePK) provides
the root of trust for all operations performed on behalf of the
node possessing the corresponding node-private key. The SHA
hash of this public key (nodePKHash) is used as a global ID, an
unambiguous and permanent reference for identifying the node.
The node description aggregates information about the
node’s current configuration and manifests at least the follow-
ing information:
The nodePK and its global ID (nodePKHash).
A description version – sequence number (descSqn) that
must be incremented with every description update or node
reboot, always allowing differentiation between the latest and
out-of-date versions of any node’s description. The exhaus-
tion of the 32-bit descSqn indicates the end-of-life of a used
nodePK.
A description signature (descSignature) matching the per-
manent nodePK given in this description and used for verifying
the authenticity and integrity (i.e. this description was indeed
created by the node with the corresponding global ID and was
not changed by anyone else) of the description.
Instead of aggregating all description data directly into a sin-
gle and self-contained description message, parts of the overall
description are defined from the root description by the SHA
hash of the actual data. Such references-based definitions are
called content references and are used for example to define
public-keys or the trust sets of a node.
The approach comes with the implication that any received
packet header or message, containing description or content ref-
erences for which the referenced raw data is not known can-
not be instantly processed and must be requested first. To re-
solve such situations, description- or content-request mes-
sages (containing only the unresolvable hash) are sent from the
node not knowing the hash-matching raw data to the (neigh-
bouring) node from which the packet containing this hash was
directly received. The node receiving a description or content
request and knowing the requested data then responds with a
corresponding description- or data-advertisements messages,
providing the requested data.
5.2. Link Authentication
Neighbour and link authentication is used to (i) let neigh-
bouring nodes, with a direct single-hop link between each other,
detect and authenticate each other as the node they claim to be
and (ii) to ensure authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation of
information exchanged between them (to avoid misunderstand-
ing: link authentication can verify information X as being stated
by neighbour A, but not that information X is necessarily true).
Since the authentication needs to be performed continuously
and with a high frequency, the underneath cryptographic op-
eration should be sufficiently lightweight to be accomplishable
even by resource-constrained embedded routers.
Link authentication is achieved by authenticating exchanged
messages with HMAC signatures. The to-be-authenticated
message is concatenated with the hash of a shared secret
(known only to the two specific link neighbours interested in
Figure 2: Protocol packet, description-, content-, and reference structure
authenticating the messages exchanged among them). The hash
of this concatenation is concatenated a second time with a dif-
ferently padded version of the shared secret. The resulting hash
is then added to the list of MACs calculated for each link neigh-
bor of a node. This list is transmitted with the original message.
The link neighbour verifies the received message and MACs by
matching the latter against its self-calculated MAC using the
received message and the shared secret as inputs.
A variation of the DH key exchange mechanism, tailored to
the concepts of SEMTOR, is used to let nodes establish the nec-
essary shared secret over a public network. Therefore, each
node (e.g. x) selects a private secret kx (only known to itself)
and publishes Kx, given as
Kx = gkx modp (1)
via its description, using pre-defined protocol constants for the
modulus p and the base g. This way, any pair of nodes, given
that each other’s description is known, can calculate a mutual
shared secret S x,y without additional handshake procedures as
described by Garzia in [84]:
S x,y = K
ky
x modp = Kkxy modp (2)
As with the transmission public keys, K values are used only
temporary and can be replaced via description updates at any
time. Further, a shared-key exchange is neither explicitly an-
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nounced nor is its completion explicitly acknowledged. A suc-
cessful shared-key exchange is only implicitly confirmed by re-
ceiving messages with a valid MAC based on a shared key cal-
culated from the latest known descriptions of the two involved
nodes.
5.3. Network Assets Authentication
5.3.1. Address, route, and traffic ownership
A Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) provides
the basis for identifying and proving the owner of addresses,
routes, and data packets. The primary IPv6 address of a
node provides such a CGA. It is computed by combining a
16-bit unique local address (ULA) [85] prefix with the most-
significant 112 bits of the node’s permanent global ID (the
nodePKHash). The concept of CGAs has been proposed by
[86], who also described mechanisms to calculate provable net-
work ranges or further enhance the security of generated ad-
dresses and networks. Addresses within this 16-bit ULA prefix
are owned by the node possessing the private key for the CGA
mathing global ID.
CGA announcements (published via the owning nodes de-
scription) are used for declaring the ownership of CGAs to
other nodes. Any description containing CGA announcements
that are not matching the nodePKHash of the originating node
are invalid and discarded upon reception.
Forwarding routes to a given CGA address, although in-
stalled in different routers, are owned by the node owning the
destination address of the routing entry and must be maintained
exclusively according to the routing updates originated by the
owning node. Any received or self-created IP-data packets con-
taining a verified CGA address as a destination address are
owned by the node owning the CGA and must be forwarded
according to the forwarding route configured to this CGA.
5.3.2. Sub-topology authentication
The trust set of a node is given as a list of global IDs of other
nodes that constitute the trusted nodes of this node. This way,
the trust set implicitly defines, with the links possible between
any pair of trusted nodes, the trusted virtual topology of this
trusting node. Only the good-listed nodes identified via this
trust set are authorized for propagating routing updates origi-
nated by the trusting node. However, instead of expecting un-
trusted nodes to respect this demand, all trusted nodes are ex-
pected to ignore routing updates originated by the trusting node
that were not received directly or securely authenticated via any
of the trusted nodes. Consequently, only neighbouring nodes
that are trusted nodes of a described trusting node are consid-
ered a next hop towards the trusting node and eventually, end-
to-end established routing entries towards this trusting node are
also only set along these trusted nodes.1
In addition, particular node IDs of a trusting primary node’s
trust set could be flagged as super-trusted nodes. This means
that all nodes that are explicitly identified via the trust set of
1In [38] Sect. 4.5.3.3 and 4.5.5 we also describe and discuss a mechanism
to delegate the selection of trusted nodes to other individual nodes
such super-trusted nodes shall also be considered trusted nodes
of the primary node. More precisely, the current overall trust
set of the primary node is given as the union of its own directly
trusted nodes, defined via its current description, and the di-
rectly trusted nodes defined via the current description of the
primary’s super-trusted nodes.
This allows to delegate, in part or entirely, the assessment of
trustworthiness to one or several other sources that are highly
and individually trusted. This way administrators can be re-
lieved from having to reconfigure all their nodes for each con-
sidered trustability change as only a single node needs to be re-
configured while all other nodes having this single node flagged
as super-trusted would automatically adapt the trust set of the
super-trusted single node. It also allows to delegate trust as-
sessment to individuals (or even autonomous systems) that may
be able to treat the topic of trustability with a much greater re-
sponsibility (for example due to a higher technical knowledge
or better social connection with many CN participants) than the
administrator of the actual delegating (primary) node.
5.3.3. Routing and heartbeat updates
An Anchored Hash Chain (AHC) value substitutes the
destination network and sequence number of routing updates
from traditional destination-sequenced distance-vector proto-
cols such as [83]. The approach has been inspired by the SEAD
protocol [31] which uses an AHC to protect the distance vec-
tor (metric) of routing updates in addition to the destination
node sequence number. In SEMTOR, the IP addresses, towards
which forwarding routes are maintained, are given by the CGA
announcements published via the AHC-referenced description
of each routing update
The creation, mapping, and validation of received AHC val-
ues has been designed as follows. Whenever a node creates a
new description it picks two random 112-bit values s0 and r0,
concatenates these with its node ID I and the upcoming desc-
Sqn, and calculates an initial SHA224 hash H0 of these ingre-
dients. This hashing is repeated nmax times2 where for each
iteration the first 112 bits of the output hash are used as input
for s:
Hn+1 = sn+1 ⊕ rn+1 = S HA224(sn ⊕ r0 ⊕ I ⊕ DescS qn) (3)
The initial hash H0 (and particularly its ingredient s0) is kept
as a private secret and is called the AHC root with which all
2nmax = 6000 has been selected as the default to limit the needed hash power
of used routing hardware, while allowing the sending of new routing updates
every 6 seconds and avoiding description updates (due to exhausted AHC val-
ues) for 6sec ∗ 6000 = 10hours. Moreover, SHA224 has been selected as the
most lightweight standard among current state-of-the-art secure hash functions.
The truncation to 112 bits has been chosen considering available data from
http://bitcoin.sipa.be/ (April 2017) that indicates the global cumulative number
of yet calculated bitcoin double-sha256 hashes around 1026 ∼ 289 which is as-
sumed to roughly correspond to that of 290 single-sha224 hashes. Thus, we
assume that, even given a doubling of hash power per year, a brute-force attack
for finding the matching first 112 bits of a SHA224 hash remains unfeasible
for the following 112 − 90 = 22 years, especially if the attacked AHC root is
invalidated every few hours with each description update.
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follow-up hashes could be easily calculated. The final hash
Hnmax is published with r0, I, descSqn, and nmax in the descrip-
tion of the node. It is called the anchor of the hash chain and
allows easy verification of whether a given 112-bit value is part
of this hash chain or not. Follow-up routing updates sent by
an originating node start revealing the pre-calculated hash val-
ues starting with nmax − 1 towards n1. The number of iterations
i needed to match the hash-chain anchor Hnmax of a received
hash-chain value sn (thus, Hnmax = Hn+i) is used to calculate the
routing update sequence number (routeSqn) as:
routeSqn = (descSqn ∗ nmax) + (i − nmax) (4)
By performing a brute-force search for a hash-chain anchor
in previously received and verified descriptions that matches a
particular iteration output of Formula (3), receiving nodes can
retain the identity of the node that originated the update and
verify its authenticity and freshness in terms of the correspond-
ing descSqn and routeSqn. This can be verified because node
Id and descSqn are mandatory inputs for calculating the chain
anchor, all of them being part of the description that has been
signed with the node Id matching the public-private key pair.
If a matching description can not be found for a received AHC
value it is requested by sending a description request message
containing the unresolvable AHC value to the node that send
the update. To relieve updates-receiving nodes from the task of
finding the hash-chain anchors for a given chain value, routing
update messages are extended with an (16-bit) internal identi-
fier field (IID) that works similar to IPsec’s SPI and is described
in more detail in [38] Ch.4.5.3.2.
Because the hash chain can not be calculated backwards, its
testimony cannot be anticipated by any other node and only
the originating node itself can create hash-chain values that
yield a newer (or greater) routeSqn than any previously yielded
routeSqn for that node. Therefore the provable routeSqn can
always be used to identify the newest heartbeat of a node and
disqualify old updates. It provides a secure heartbeat that makes
so called “false destination sequence attacks” [87] impossible.
Routing updates exchanged between neighbouring nodes are
covered by the link authentication mechanism described in Sec-
tion 5.2, allowing verification of the authenticity, integrity, and
non-repudiation of exchanged information. The signature of the
sender covering the update allows the receiving node to verify
whether the sender is authentic. The AHC-referenced descrip-
tion and contained trustSet allows the receiving node to verify
if the sender is trusted by the originating node and whether the
contained metric can be accepted for further path maintenance.
This way, a routing update can be considered a signed promise
by each propagating node, stating to the receiving nodes that
(i) this particular update has been propagated exclusively via
nodes trusted by the originator of the message, and (ii) that all
intermediate nodes also stated their willingness and capability
for routing packets (with destination addresses as expressed via
the referenced and signed description) towards the originating
node.
5.3.4. Optional description content
Without going into further detail, several optional node prop-
erties that are relevant in the context of computer networks can
be propagated via node descriptions such as Routing metric def-
initions ([22] and [88]), hostname, tunnel, or tunnel-route an-
nouncements.
5.4. Bootstrapping Example
Figure 3 illustrates related bootstrapping procedures of the
protocol in four phases: (1) the local node discovery, (2) link
discovery, (3) global node discovery and trusted path establish-
ment.
The local node discovery (phase 1) shows how nodes n2 and
n3 react on the reception of a new (for n2 and n3 yet unknown)
nodePKHash (I) or descSqn (given here by a received packet
header) and resolve the description, identity (pubKey) and fur-
ther referenced description content by sending corresponding
description or content request messages (containing only the
unresolvable hash) to node n1. Then n1 replies with the re-
quested information. When all requested content has been re-
solved, n2 and n3 can assemble the full description and verify
its authenticity with the signature and public key as defined by
the initially received nodePKHash that triggered this process.
The descHhash and signature are calculated over the raw de-
scription data and contained data hashes as they occur (not the
referenced original data).
A transmission signature message (txSignature in Fig. 2
and 3) verifies the authenticity and integrity of all following
signature-demanding messages. These include the locally ex-
changed link-discovery and routing-update messages but do not
include the eventually globally exchanged descriptions (already
signed explicitly via description signatures) or content adver-
tisements (already signed implicitly via SHA reference hashes
used in the signed descriptions).
To protect against link-local replay attacks, the txSignature
also covers the transmission sequence number (txSqn) that
again can only be reused after renewing the currently used txPK
and a transmission IP (txIP) that must match the link-local src
IPv6 address of the IP packet containing the protocol data.
The link discovery (phase 2) briefly indicates how the pro-
vided functionality can be used to authenticate the exchange
of link-probing messages and subsequent deduced link quali-
ties. Here, the hello message contains a sequence number that
is unique during the lifetime of a node’s description and the
corresponding hello-reply message unambiguously references
a previously received hello message and link through which this
message has been transmitted (by specifying the hello-sequence
number, the current description hash of the hello-sending node,
and the txIP from which the hello message has been sent and re-
ceived through its own interface). By receiving correctly signed
hello and hello-reply messages (referencing the receiver’s own
hello messages via the included txSqn and txIP), the exchange
of link-probing messages becomes a continuous and bidirec-
tional challenge-response handshake that only the holder of the
corresponding private keys can maintain.
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Figure 3: Network bootstrapping (node, link, and path discovery)
During the global node discovery (phase 3), nodes are dis-
covered beyond the link neighbourhood. The discovery is trig-
gered by the detection of an unresolvable AHC value contained
in routing updates, which causes the receiving nodes to resolve
and verify the full node description (similar to local node dis-
covery in phase 1).
Phase 3 also illustrates the establishment and setup of for-
warding paths along trusted nodes. First n2 and n3 receive
the routing update from n1, whose description has already been
fully resolved in phase 1. Because the update was received via
an authenticated link (due to its txSignature) with known link
quality (see phase 2) and because n1 itself is listed as a trusted
node in the description, n2 and n3 know that n1 trusts the trans-
mitter of the received message regarding correctly processing,
updating, and re-broadcasting its routing-update messages. The
end-to-end path cost to the originating node and via the trusted
link peer can be calculated based on the path metric of the up-
date and the current link quality. In case the calculated cost
identifies this link as the best next hop towards the originating
node, the routing update is re-broadcasted with a modified path
metric value that reflects the cost of the additional link (see [89]
for more details).
In the next illustrated step, node n3 and n4 receive the routing
update originated by n1 and re-broadcasted by n2. This time,
the update-conveying txSignature verifies n2 as the transmitter
and last modifier of the routing update. However, the identity
(nodePKHash) of n2 is not listed in the trust set described by
the originating node n1; therefore, the update is discarded (by
n3 and n4) for path establishment towards n1. Node n4 does not
have a trusted route to n1 unless it receives the routing update
via n3, which is listed within the trust set of n1 and can therefore
be considered a next hop towards n1. The topology depicted
at the bottom of phase 3 illustrates with arrows the resulting
virtual topology for routing traffic towards n1. In this example,
n2 is the only node that n1 does not trust. Consequently, its
traffic is directed around n2. Given the assumption that n3 trusts
all nodes, phase 3b, with blue arrows, illustrates the concurrent
established topology for routing traffic towards node n3. Traffic
from n4 to n3 will be routed via n2 (due to potentially strong
involved links n4−n2−n1). However, traffic towards n1 remains
routed via n3 (being the only trusted path option towards n1).
5.5. Summary of Properties
The fundamental properties of this approach are summarized
as follows:
• Descriptions can be short while securely specifying large
amounts of data (e.g., a single 224-bit SHA2 hash com-
pared to a 2048-bit RSA signature or a trust set listing the
global IDs of hundreds of nodes).
• Referenced data that does not change over a description
update or that is used by several nodes (e.g., defining equal
trust sets) does not need to be re-propagated since their
reference (hash) would not change and can be reused.
• A significant processing advantage is achieved using a
lightweight DH-HMAC-based verification mechanism for
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the continuous and frequent packet signing and validation
operations (typically occurring several times per second).
In contrast, a reasonably strong and asymmetric RSA key
can be used for signing the rather seldom-propagated de-
scription updates (typically once per hour) and thereby al-
lowing a long-term protection of node IDs and descrip-
tions.
• The mechanisms provide an infrastructure that allows
(without requiring any pre-deployed central registry) the
network-wide, dynamic, and secure (in terms of authen-
ticity and integrity) distribution of public node keys that
are further leveraged for integrity verification of node IDs,
descriptions, link-discovery and routing-update messages
between neighbouring nodes and ensures the propagation
of routing updates and the establishment of forwarding
path only along nodes trusted by the originator of these
updates.
• With the ability to delegate the maintenance of trust sets
to individually selected super-trusted nodes, it is possible
to share and distribute the work of trustability assessment
while conserving decentrality and self-determination and
ensuring each actual node owner as the final root of trust
that can withdraw or extend previously defined delegations
at any time.
6. Specification and Correctness
6.1. Definitions
• A node description DX,Q denotes a particular version Q ∈
N+ of a statements’ summary created and signed by the
node with the identity VX . A valid description DX,Q =
{DcX,Q, S X,DcX,Q } contains unsigned description components
DcX,Q and a signature S X,d = s(K
priv
X , d) with data d = D
c
X,Q
that, created with the private key K privX of VX . D
c
X,Q, covers
non-ambiguously definitions for VX , KX , Q = QdX , AX , V
t
X ,
M̂X , and fX(M, L) as defined in the following. Nodes are
supposed to learn the latest description (with highest de-
scription sequence number Qd) of all other nodes. There-
fore each node creates and broadcasts a description for it-
self which is then flooded by receiving nodes across the
network. All nodes are also supposed to resend any ear-
lier flooded description when demanded by a neighbour-
ing node so that new nodes can learn the descriptions of
already existing nodes. Further background in section 5.1.
• The primary IPv6 address AX = a(VX) of a node is a Cryp-
tographically Generated Address (CGA) based on a trun-
cated version of the nodes identity VX . The existence of
a sufficiently secure CGA function a(V) (as described in
section 5.3.1) that provides proof of identity and owner-
ship is assumed for this work.
• A link-metric function l(EB,A) = LB,A with L ∈ R+ is a
heuristic function that quantifies the quality of a given link
as a positive real value (including zero). For any LB,A ≥
LZ,Y it is defined that the link quality of link EB,A is better
than (equal to) that of EZ,Y . The existence of a sufficient
link-metric function is assumed for this work. A simple
but sufficient link-metric function for letting VA assess the
quality of link EB,A is described in [38]
• The overall topology of a network is given by the graph
G = g(V,E) representing all nodes V ∈ V as vertices and
all links E ∈ E as edges if l(E) > 0.
• A path-quality value MT,S and path-metric function
m(VT ,Vs, fT , M̂T ) with VT ≡ V0,VS ≡ Vs, s ≥ 1 is defined
as:
MT,S = M0,s =
m(VT ,Vs, fT , M̂T ) =

if s == 1 : fT (M̂T , LT,s−1,s), else
if fT (m(VT ,Vs−1), LT,s−1,s) == 0 : 0
else : fT (m(VT ,Vs−1), LT,s−1,s
M̂T is a constant defined by VT via DT,Q for the upper
bound of any MT,S . fT (M, L) is the customizer function
specified via DT,Q. It must ensure that
0 ≤ f (M, L) < M < M̂ for any M ∈ R+ , L ∈ R+ (5)
A function satisfying (5) would also ensure that:
– Greater path quality values reflect better paths, thus
for any path PT,A = {VT , ...,VA} with a better (equal)
path quality than another path PT,X = {VT , ...,VX}
that MT,A > (=) MT,X .
– A sub path PT,A = {VT , ...VA} of another path PT,X =
{VT , ...,VA, ...,VX}with equal destination VT and path
components up to including VA must lead a greater
path metric MT,A than that of MT,X . The existence of
a sufficient path metric is assumed for this work.
• A route RT,S = {VT ,Vs−1,Vs} explicitly identifies the
next hop Vs−1 of a particular path PT,S from Vs ≡ VS
via Vs−1 and implicitly defines also all following nodes
Vs−2, ...V1,V0 to V0 ≡ VT .
• The set of all routes from VS to VT with different next hops
is limited by the number of neighbours of VS and is given
as RT,S .
A routing function r(VT ,Va) = RT,A = {VT ,Va−1,Va} im-
plicitly also identifies all consecutive nodes by iterative re-
solving Va−2 from r(VT ,Va−1) = {VT ,Va−2,Va−1}.
• The trust set VtX ⊆ V of a node VX lists the node iden-
tities (including itself) of its trusted nodes. E.g.: VtX =
{VA,VB,VC ,VX}.
• A trusting node is a node (e.g. VS ) that defines a non-
empty trust set VtS to secure itself against attacks from
non-trusted nodes. Therefore, the cardinality of VtS must
be greater or equal than one: |VtS | ≥ 1. Thus, if a particular
node VX does not trust any other node then it would define














Figure 4: Cases in SEMTOR considering trust, correctness, and a detection
mechanism
• A trusted node is a node (e.g. VX) which is explicitly listed
in the trust set VtA of a given node VA. This is formalized
as VX ∈ VtA. A non-trusted node VY is a node which is
not listed in the trust set of a given other node VA, for-
malized as VY < VtA. Thus, trust is a tuple of the trusted
node (VX) and the trusting node (VA). A particular node
VZ can be a trusted node of node VA and at the same time
be a non-trusted node of node VB: VZ ∈ VtA
∧
VZ < VtB.
Trust relations are not implicitly symmetric, e.g.: VZ ∈
VtA
∧
VA < VtZ . Direct trust relations are not transitive,





• A link EB,A is a trusted link of node VX if the two neigh-
bouring nodes VA and VB are trusted nodes of VX . The
trusted link set EtX of node VX is defined as
EtX = {EB,A|EB,A ∈ E,VA ∈ TX ,VB ∈ TX} (6)
• The trusted topology GtX of node VX is a sub graph of
G(T,L) consisting of vertices V ∈ TtX and edges E ∈ E
t
X





• A trusted path is a connected end-to-end path between a
given source-destination-node tuple that consists only of
trusted nodes and links of the (trusting) destination node.
It represents one particular combination of consecutive
links from the trusted topology of the destination node.
A trusted route denotes, according to a given path metric,
the currently best existing trusted path.
6.2. Desired Properties
For any given node VT two orthogonal properties of nodes
are considered: correct (Vc ∈ VcT ) versus adverse (Vc < V
c
T ),
and trusted nodes (V t ∈ VtT ) versus non-trusted nodes (V t <
VtT ). This leads to four possible combinations as illustrated by
the four sectors in Figure 4: Non-trusted correct nodes, trusted
correct nodes, non-trusted adversaries, and trusted adversaries.
For any given (T, S )-path tuple and network graph G one of
the following topological constellations can be considered:
a) Incorrect path: S is isolated from T either because a con-
tinuous (T, S )-path in G does not exist at all or because
not a single consecutive path exists that consists only of
T -correct nodes: PcT,S = ∅
b) Correct path: At least one (T, S )-path of T -correct nodes
exists, that may (or may not) consist of T -trusted nodes,
but some T -trusted nodes of G may be T -adverse (incor-





c) Correct trust and path: At least one (T, S )-path of only T -
correct nodes exists and T -trusted adversaries do not exist
but a (T, S )-path of only T -trusted nodes may not exist:




T = ∅ ∧ P
t
T,S = ∅
d) Correctly trusted nodes and path: At least one
(T, S )-path of only T -trusted and correct nodes
exists and T -trusted adversaries do not exist:




T = ∅ ∧ P
c
T,S , ∅
We are interested in the correct and continuous provisioning
of awareness (node and node state discovery) and reachability
(path and route discovery and packet delivery) services.
These services can be characterized by a set of properties
[90, 56] that can be differentiated between safety and liveness
properties [91, 92].
Safety properties state the guarantee that bad things do not
happen:
• Information authenticity and integrity are mandatory prop-
erties for an awareness service that, in our case, shall prop-
agate node descriptions and heartbeats. We define this
property as update-safety which guarantees that if a QT,S -
sequenced update (supposedly created by VT ) can be ver-
ified by a receiving node VS as correct then it must have
been sent earlier by the supposed originating node VT as
QT,T and has propagated unchanged to VS . Because every
QT,T,τn ∈ N+ sent by VT at time τn must be greater or equal
to any previously sent QT,T,τn−1 , τn > τn−1 this guarantee is
expressed as: QT,T,τ ≥ QT,S ,τ. This property shall apply to
description and heartbeat updates, sequenced with Qd and
Qh respectively.
• Path-adversary-freedom is an important property for guar-
anteeing the reachability of VT from VS along a path. A
path PT,S is adversary-free if it has no adversary nodes.
• Adversary-resilience: Routing is adversary-resilient if
its behaviour under the presence of adversary nodes is
equivalent to that of a network that has no adversary
nodes. This means that adversary nodes, if present, do
not have any noticeable effect. An update-safe awareness
service and a delivery service that routes and forwards
data packets only along adversary free paths can be
considered adversary resilient.
• Loop-freedom: A path is loop-free if it has no repetition
of nodes.
• Consistency: packets only traverse loop- and adversary-
free paths between source and destination. We define this
property as route-safety for any established route RT,S that
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consists only of non-repetitive nodes that behave correctly
(non-adversary) regarding VT : RT,S ⊆ VtT .
There are also liveness properties which state that good
things [eventually] happen:
• Update freshness: An update is fresh with respect to an
interval I and an incrementally increasing update-version
Q (update-sequence number) if the last received update
QT,S ,τ from VT by VS at time τ is greater or equal than
any update QT,T,τ−I sent by VT since I. We define update-
liveness as the property that guarantees update freshness
so that: QT,S ,τ ≥ QT,T,τ−I .
• Route freshness: A route RT,S ,τ from VS to VT at time τ is
fresh with respect to an interval I = (τ − I, τ) and a given
set of existing paths PT,S ,I if all implicitly via RT,S ,τ de-
fined consecutive hops and respective links are up during
I. We define route-liveness as the property that guaran-
tees in addition to route freshness also consistency so that:
RT,S ,τ ∈ PcT,S ,I .
• Route accuracy: A route RT,S is accurate if it is consistent
and fresh and, with respect to a path-metric function mT ()
defined via DT,Q, if the path-metric value calculated and
re-propagated by VS conforms with the actual link-metrics
LB,A between all successive path nodes VB,VA ∈ RT,S .
• Responsiveness: Depending on the logic of the routing-
update process, updates received by a node are validated
(which, if necessary, may include the immediate request
and resolution of depending information) and applied to
its forwarding table and propagated to other routers, in-
cluding those that potentially depend upon the outcome of
the update. This affects how quickly the network reacts to
changes and therefore it qualifies the timeliness of fresh-
ness.
It is assumed that the transmission delay υ (from data-link
layer assumptions in section 4.2) of up links and the re-
sponsiveness ρ of correct nodes for processing received
updates and responding to resolution requests from neigh-
bours is much smaller than I: υ + τ  I
• Delivery: data packets get eventually delivered to its des-
tination though a path, with statistical guarantees as chan-
nels are usually lossy, typically in a small percentage. This
property depends on the liveness of updates (freshness)
and routes (freshness and accuracy).
• Efficiency: The expected resource overhead cost for each
node amortized over all usage. Resources can be process-
ing (CPU, memory in nodes) and communication (traffic
in links), and the overhead cost, the additional resource
consumption due to the protocol translated into a perfor-
mance penalty (cost).
Safety and liveness properties about updates and routes are
the basis to ensure overall properties: the (safety) consistency
and resilience to adversaries; and the (liveness) responsiveness,
delivery and efficiency of routing.
Table 3 summarizes the desired safety and liveness properties
and identifies the previously described topology constellations
a) - d) for which these properties shall be satisfied. Here the
∗-symbol is used to indicate that no assumptions are made on
the requirement given in the respective header row (thus, may
be true or false) and the X-symbol is used to indicate that a
corresponding property can be satisfied. None of the four con-
stellations makes assumptions on the presence of non-trusted
adversaries.
It should be noted that the assumptions and objectives out-
lined in section 3.1 are actually reflected by the conditions and
properties listed for constellation d) while constellation a) to c)
list properties that shall be provided under even less restrictive
conditions.
Regarding the security objective: Any group of nodes (e.g.
subeset VX ⊆ VY ) that is trusting (so ∀VT ∈ VX : VtT = VX),
willing to cooperate and support each other (correct, so VX ⊆
VcT with V
t




T = ∅, so not trusted adver-
saries exist), and contiguous (connected, so with VtT = VX ⇒
∀VT ,VS ∈ VX : PtT,S , ∅) cannot be inhibited by an exter-
nal VZ < VX on the objective of routing packets to each other
(which is satisfied by the given route-safety and -liveness prop-
erties).
6.3. Proving Correctness
In this section we analyze the safety and liveness properties
defined in section 6.2 for updates and routes as lemmas and
theorems that we prove with formal reasoning.
Lemma 1. Descriptions discovered by SEMTOR are authentic
and can be differentiated between older and newer versions, in-
dependent of the presence of trusted or non-trusted adversaries.
Proof: A description DX,Q received by a SEMTOR node
is only accepted as valid if it contains the components




X , AX ,V
t
X ,MX , fX} and a signature S X,DcX,Q
for which VX equals v(K
pub
X ) and s(K
pub
X , S ,D
c
X,Q) is true and
QdX is greater than any earlier received and accepted descrip-
tion from VX . Description integrity is proven because, given
Assumption 1, a s(K pubX , S ,D
c
X,Q)-correct signature cannot be
created by any other node than VX , and therefore not by any
adverse node. Identity and authenticity is implicitly proven be-
cause of the matching signature and VX matching v(K
pub
X ). Ex-
clusive ownership of AX is proven based on Cryptographically
Generated Address (CGA) respective rules. Possibly earlier re-
ceived descriptions from VX can be reliably identified as out-
dated if contained Qdearlier < Q
d
current. 
Lemma 2. Heartbeats discovered by SEMTOR are authentic,
can be related to a particular description of the originating
node, and can be differentiated between older and newer ver-
sions, independent of the presence of trusted or non-trusted ad-
versaries.
Proof: A heartbeat QbX,Q received by a SEMTOR node is
only accepted as valid and identified as originated by VX if,
among the latest accepted descriptions known from any node,
one can be found that contains an AHC anchor QaX,Q, which
13
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RT,S ,Qh ⊆ VcT,Qd RT,S ,τ ∈
PcT,S ,(τ−I..τ)
a) * * * * X - - -
b) true * * * X X - -
c) true true * * X X X(RT,S = ∅) -
d) true true true * X X X(RT,S , ∅) X





X), and one of the following conditions is
true: Either QhX is equal to or greater than any previously ac-
cepted QhX value from VX that was based on the same Q
a
X,Q and
Q = QdX , or the last accepted heartbeat sequence from VX was
based on an outdated description from VX that has since then
be replaced by the receiving node with an accepted updated de-
scription. The authenticity belonging to a particular descrip-
tion and the differentiability (in older and newer versions) of
heartbeats is proven because of the cryptographic properties of
AHCs (see also section 5.3.3 and Assumption 1). This assump-
tion also covers VX and QdX so that only the originating node VX
that knows the secret AHC root can create heartbeats that yield
QhX values that are acceptable as newer (greater) than the heart-
beat with the greatest corresponding QhX value ever sent before
by VX . 
Theorem 1. SEMTOR guarantees update-safety: the authen-
ticity, integrity, and differentiability of discovered node descrip-
tions and heartbeats.
Proof: From Lemmas 1 and 2. 
Theorem 2. SEMTOR guarantees update-liveness: Descrip-
tions and heartbeats discovered by SEMTOR in the presence
of correct paths are fresh so that any description DX,Q or heart-
beat QbX,Q originated at time t1 by VX with Q = Q
d
X is discovered
by any VY before time t2 = t1 + I if a consecutive path PcX,Y of
VX-correct nodes exists between VX and VY that is up during
the entire interval I = (t1, t2).
Proof: Let Ih = (t2 − t1) be the interval duration with which
each node VX broadcasts a new heartbeat (update) QbX,Q yielding
a heartbeat-sequence number QhX,Q that is one greater than the
previously broadcasted heartbeat sequence of VX . If an up-link
between the QbX,Q-broadcasting node and a correct neighbour-
ing node VN of the broadcasting node exists during the broad-
cast of QbX,Q then VN receives Q
b
X,Q and one of the following
three cases occur:
(i) VN already knows and accepted DX,Q (see Lemma 1), on
which QbX,Q is based and has also already accepted Q
b
X,Q (see
Lemma 2) due to an earlier reception from a neighbouring node
of VN . Then, VN only responds to description requests received
from its neighbouring nodes that demand a description known
by VN .
(ii) VN already knows and accepted DX,Q, on which QbX,Q is
based and accepts QbX,Q as a new heartbeat update. Then, Q
b
X,Q
is re-broadcasted by VN .
(iii) VN does not know DX,Q, on which QbX,Q is based. Then,
the acceptance processing of QbX,Q is postponed by VN for at
most Ih, QbX,Q is cached for possible later processing for the du-
ration of Ih, and a request is broadcasted to all neighbouring
nodes of VN demanding a description that allows VN to accept
QbX,Q. Within I
h, if a description DX,Q is received by VN that
is acceptable and yet unknown by VN , then VN accepts DX,Q
and searches its cached heartbeats for one that can be accepted
based on DX,Q. If this is the case, then VN continues as de-
scribed for case (ii).
As a consequence of this mechanism, and given that the
transmission delay of up links and the responsiveness of cor-
rect nodes for processing received updates and responding to
requests is much smaller than I, then QbX,Q and DX,Q will be re-
ceived, accepted, and re-broadcasted by all correct neighbour-
ing VN nodes of the originating node VX to which a link exists
during I. In addition, they will be further propagated to all cor-
rect neighbouring nodes of VN , which, if behaving correctly,
will further propagate these until they are accepted by all nodes
VY to which a consecutive path PcX,Y of VX-correct nodes exists
that is up during the entire interval I. 
Theorem 3. SEMTOR guarantees route-safety: Routes discov-
ered by SEMTOR in the presence of non-trusted adversaries
(implying that trusted adversaries do not exist) are loop free
and adversary free.
Proof: Any destination node VT broadcasts a new and signed
routing update message UT,QbT ,T = {Q
b
T ,MT,T } with each new
heartbeat update QbT and with MT,T = M̂T .
Any route RT,S ,QbT to destination VT , propagated via routing
update messages UT,QbT ,N = {Q
b
T ,MT,N}, and broadcasted by
node VN (VN may be equal to VT ) is only accepted by a correct
receiving node VS if all the following conditions are satisfied.
(i) The current description DN,QdN of VN is known and ac-
cepted (from proof of Lemma 1).
(ii) The transmission signature that covers UT,QbT ,N proves the
authenticity and integrity of the update as having been created
and broadcasted by VN (note also Assumptions 2 and 1 and re-
lated mechanism details described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.3).
(iii) A description DT,QdT is known that allows accepting Q
b
T
from UT,QbT ,N as a valid heartbeat update from VT (from proof
of Lemma 2)
(iv) QbT is either new or Q
b
T is equal to the newest heartbeat
update from VT and MT,N from UT,QbT ,N is the greatest path-
metric value ever accepted (via any neighbour) for VT . QbT .
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(v) MT,N from UT,QbT ,N is greater than zero.
(vi) VN is listed as a trusted node in VtT from DT,QdN .
Only if a routing-update messages received by the correct
node VS is accepted as valid then VS configures a forwarding
route to VT via VN and propagates the route further by creating
and broadcasting a new and VS -signed update as: UT,QbT ,S =
{QbT ,MT,S } with MT,S < MT,N .
Condition (vi) is only true if VN ∈ VtT , which, given that
VtT ⊆ V
c
T , implies that VN ∈ V
c
T . Therefore, routes are only ac-
cepted and configured if propagated along correct and therefore
adversary free, paths.
Condition (iv) is only true if the contained heartbeat and/or
path-metric value represents an update that is newer or better
than any previously received updates by the processing node.
Therefore neither the processing node, nor any other correctly
processing node, could yet be part of a route established by
any updates with the same heartbeat sequence. Therefore, all
accepted routes are loop free. 
Theorem 4. SEMTOR guarantees route liveness: Routes dis-
covered by SEMTOR, in the presence of non-trusted adver-
saries (implying that trusted adversaries do not exist) and at
least one correct and trusted path, are fresh.
Proof: The proof of route-liveness is provided by an equiva-
lent reasoning as given for Theorem 2.
As a consequence of the routing-update propagation mecha-
nism from the proof of Theorem 3, and given that the transmis-
sion delay of up links and the responsiveness of correct nodes
for processing received updates and responding to requests is
much smaller than I, then any routing update UT originated by
VT will be received, accepted, and further propagated by all cor-
rect neighbouring VN nodes of VT to which a link exists during
I. Additionally, they will be further propagated to all correct
neighbouring nodes of VN which, if behaving correct, will fur-
ther propagate these till they are accepted by all nodes VS to
which a consecutive path Pc,tT,S of VT -correct and trusted nodes
exists that is up during the entire interval I. 
7. Experimental Validation
7.1. Implementation and Validation Framework
In this section the key security and performance achieve-
ments of SEMTOR are validated experimentally. Therefore,
the proposed SEMTOR mechanisms have been implemented by
extending the BMX6 routing protocol which eventually became
BMX7 (BMX6 + SEMTOR = BMX7). This BMX7 imple-
mentation has then been observed when exposed to key attack
scenarios and challenging network environments.
The BMX6 [16] routing-protocol has been selected as a ba-
sis because its message structure and handling already pro-
vides functional support for node-descriptive profiles, SHA
hashes as referencing identifier, and a “hash-based profile-
propagation mechanism” to disseminate node descriptions. For
cryptographic operations such as hashing, asymmetric-key gen-
eration, signing, and verification the MbedTLS [93] library
Table 4: Protocol implementation details
Topic Details and used default
Protocol Source code SEMTOR/BMX7 branch, git revi-
sion ee2f1d86
Crypto Library MbedTLS version 2.4.0
Node-identity and description ref-
erenciation
SHA224 (RFC4634) hashes
Primary key foundation RSA2048 (RFC8017)
Asymmetric txKey foundation RSA896 (RFC8017)
Symmetric txKey foundation 112-bit truncated SHA224-MAC
based on DHM2048 (RFC3526)
negotiated shared key
Description-update interval 36000 s
Heartbeat authentication 112-bit truncated, SHA224-based,
anchored hash chain
Routing updates interval 6 s
Link-probing interval 0.8 s
Aggregation (TX) interval 0.8 s
has been used. Our SEMTOR extensions currently sup-
ports RSA512 to RSA4096 public-key authentication for node
and description verification, SHA224-based hashes for node-,
description-, and routing-update references (the latter based on
anchored-hash chains), and DH-key exchange for MAC-based
neighbour verification. The complete source code is publicly
available via the SEMTOR/BMX7 git-repositorys [16, 94].
Protocol implementation details are summarised in Table 4.
The scenarios to which our implementation was exposed
were realised with an emulated network consisting of Linux
nodes and using MLC [95], a suite of LXC-based scripts,3 that
allow virtualization of hundreds of Debian systems inside a sin-
gle host and configuration of virtual topologies, essentially by
linking virtual or real node interfaces via a virtual bridge and
using ebtables4 and tc5 to control packet loss and delay between
nodes on layer two.
The host system was an Intel i5-3230M 2.60 GHz CPU with
four CPU cores and 8 GB RAM, allowing more than 200 virtual
systems and protocol instances to run in parallel.
Further emulation parameters and ranges used for the func-
tionality validation in Section 7.2 and the performance mea-
surements in Section 7.3 are given in Table 5. The selected
probing ranges comprise network sizes and densities that are
typical for deployments in clouds and core-graph zones of real
CNs [3, 4, 5, 69, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 71, 73].
7.2. Validation of Functionality
To validate our design and implementation (regarding the
ownership, security, openness, and decentralization objectives
as outlined in Section 3.1), several representative network at-
tacks have been set up and analyzed. section 7.2.1 first details
the implementation of different attack vectors and section 7.2.2
evaluates their effect on a node that naively (and falsely) trusts
3Linux containers http://lxc.sourceforge.net/.
4Linux ebtables, http://ebtables.sourceforge.net
5Linux traffic control: tc, http://tldp.org/HOWTO/
Traffic-Control-HOWTO/.
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Table 5: Emulation defaults and ranges
Parameter Default [range] Figures
Host hardware Intel i5-3230M, 2.6 GHz, 4
cores, 8 GB RAM
Host system Linux, Debian
Emulation system MLC git rev. d63f726c
Network virtualization LXC, ebtables, qdisc, tc, brctl
Emulated systems Linux, Debian
Measurement tools tcpdump, top, ping, iperf
Network structure (topology) Grid 10x10 [10x2..20] 11
Link loss 0% loss [0%..60%] 9
Node interfaces 1
Network size (# of nodes) 100 [10..200] 12a,12c
Density (# of links per node) 4 [4..20] 12d,
12f
Primary key strength RSA2048 [512..4096]
TxKey method RSA512..1536 vs. DHM2048 [25], 12
Own description-upd. freq. 1/10h [0..0.5 Hz] 12b
Others description-upd. freq. 100/10h [0..5 Hz] 12e
in the correct behaviour of all nodes (including existing mali-
cious and attacking nodes), which corresponds with constella-
tion b) from Table 3.
Section 7.2.3 then validates our SEMTOR implementation
and quantifies its performance to recover, when attacking nodes
have been correctly identified (as given by constellation d) from
Table 3), from the most powerful combination of previously in-
troduced attacks. Eventually, Section 7.2.4 illustrates further
protocol achievements for supporting openness, decentraliza-
tion, and cooperativeness.
7.2.1. Attack vectors
To experimentally validate the resistance of SEMTOR when
exposed to attacks, an implementation is needed that supports
the execution of a corresponding attack. In this section, we de-
scribe and validate the implemented attacks by observing their
effect on a node that is reachable via paths consisting of correct
and adverse nodes and that considers all, thus including the at-
tacking nodes, as trusted. That corresponds to the most adverse
topology constellation b) from Section 6.2.
For the below detailed attacks, an attacking node behaves,
unless explicitly noted, like a correct node (only the deviations
from the correct behaviour are described). Functions imple-
menting these attack-specific deviations from the correct be-
haviour are provided via a so-called ‘evil’ plugin, extending
the default protocol implementation with malicious capabili-
ties. The plugin allows (i) defining a set of attacked nodes based
on a list of node IDs and (ii) defining the combination of attacks
performed on these nodes.
We have considered attacks to manipulate or selectively sup-
press routing information about the identity and description of
the nodes, the routing updates, and route announcements.
An identity hijacking attack (IHA) would be given by any
successful attempt to propagate a manufactured or modified de-
scription of an attacked node, for example, by replacing the
trust set or transmission key of the attacked node’s original
description. One variance of such description manufacturing
has been implemented by transmitting descriptions of attacked
node IDs with an incremented description SQN.
Tests confirmed that manipulated descriptions are discarded
immediately upon reception by any correctly behaving node be-
cause of the description signature mismatch with the node ID’s
public key (remember that a node ID is defined as the SHA hash
of its public key). To successfully execute this attack, an adver-
sary would need to manufacture a matching signature, which
is possible only by knowing the node ID’s private key. There-
fore, any IHA attack must fail as long as private keys are not
compromised.
A route (or primary IP) hijacking attack (RHA) is im-
plemented by letting an attacking node announce the primary
(CGA) IP addresses of the attacked nodes via its own descrip-
tion and propagating this and the description-referencing rout-
ing updates to the network via its neighbouring nodes.
Tests confirmed that such composed descriptions and
description-referencing routing updates are discarded immedi-
ately upon reception by any correctly behaving node because
the contained CGA announcements do not match the descrip-
tion node ID.
A heartbeat (or routing-update) manufacturing attack
(HMA) is implemented by transmitting all internally scheduled
routing-update messages that reference the description of an at-
tacked node ID with a hash-chain value replaced with random
bits.
Tests confirmed that such way manipulated and received
routing-update messages are not further processed or propa-
gated because the contained hash-chain value does not match
the hash-chain anchor of any known description.
A description dropping attack (DDA) is achieved by dis-
carding all internally scheduled description transmissions that
contain a node ID matching any of the attacked node IDs.
A routing-update dropping attack (UDA) is achieved by
discarding all internally scheduled routing message transmis-
sions that reference the description of an attacked node ID.
A routing-update metric manipulation attack (MMA) is
achieved by transmitting all internally scheduled update mes-
sages that reference the description of an attacked node ID with
a metric value modified to the maximum (best), suggesting to
the update-receiving nodes a better path than actually exist.
In contrast to all former attacks, which can be classified
as control-plane attacks, a route or traffic dropping attack
(RDA) represents a typical data-plane attack. This is achieved
by configuring a route towards the primary (CGA) address of
an attacked node into a virtual ‘/dev/null’ interface that drops
all IP packets routed into it (instead of via the next hop of its
collectively established path).
From the above attacks, three categories can be identified: (i)
Attacks that every correctly behaving SEMTOR node always
secures against: The first three (IHA, RHA, and HMA) attacks
are of this kind. As they are prevented by design no further
exploration of such attacks is needed.
(ii) Attacks that can be considered relatively harmless be-
cause the behaviour of the attackers is similar to the case in
which the attackers do not exist: The DDA and UDA attacks
are of this kind. However, it should be noted that the combi-
nation of the DDA attack with the RDA or MMA attack does
make a difference that can be lucrative from an attackers per-
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spective because not supporting the propagation of an attacked
node’s description updates may increase the latency with which
these are eventually received by all other nodes. Especially, if
such an update is received late, then it has the attacking node
removed from its previous trust set.
(iii) Attacks that the protocol only secures against if per-
formed by non-trusted nodes: These are given by the latter
MMA and RDA attacks, which are analyzed (in combination
with the DDA) in more detail in the following sections. To
neutralize these attacks, it is necessary to identify the incorrect
nodes and mark them as non-trusted. This identification could
be achieved either by improving the assessment of trustability
on a social layer among CN members, or it could be automated
with a monitoring and distributed detection protocol. For the
analysis of the re-coverage performance of SEMTOR in sec-
tion 7.2.3, we take the availability of eventually correctly as-
sessed trustability as given and focus on the performance of the
protocol to enforce such updated assessments.
7.2.2. Network Attack Scenarios
To further explore the power of different attacks we first as-
sume a network scenario without non-trusted nodes (thus, all
nodes are trusted, whether correct or not) and therefore also
without counter-measures. The used network scenario, as out-
lined in Figure 5, allows placing one or more adversaries (inter-
mediate B-nodes) on differently “good” strategic positions for
attacking the routing process between an attacked destination
node DA and a given source node S . As an example, by ac-
tivating, in addition to the permanent links (illustrated as solid
lines), the optional S B4 link between node S and B4, any com-
munication between nodes S and DA would fully rely on the
only possible end-to-end path S − B4− B3− B2−DA, allowing
any intermediate node B2, B3, or B4 to easily disrupt this com-
munication, simply by dropping any packet (doing an RDA)
sent via them to DA. However, if the optional S A2 link is also
activated, then an alternative end-to-end path from S , via A2 to
DA emerges which is also shorter than the previous path. In
this case, the position of node B3 is less advantageous for at-
tacking the communication between S and DA and additional
attack measures (such as MMA) would be needed to convince
node S to send packets to DA via the longer (RDA performing)
S − B4 − B3 − B2 − DA path.
Further measurements are executed as follows. At time T0,
all nodes start bootstrapping a previously configured network
topology and establishing end-to-end paths to all other nodes
which takes less than 40 seconds to complete. At a randomly
selected time Tx between 50 and 55 seconds, node S starts
sending ICMPv6 packets with an interval of 10 ms to both des-
tination nodes in parallel. At the same time all intermediate
B- nodes start performing combined DDA and RDA attacks on
destination node DA.
The graphs in Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the effect of the ap-
plied attacks in terms of success and latency as the duration
(averaged over 5 measurement probes) between the attack acti-
vation at Tx and its successful completion. The completion is
measured from two perspectives. The path-collapse time rep-
resents the duration between Tx and the last successfully deliv-
ered packet to the corresponding destination node. If none of
the packets sent by node S since Tx were ever delivered, then
this duration is assumed to be zero, meaning that the attack suc-
ceeded immediately.
On the other hand, if packets continued to be delivered for
more than 40 seconds since Tx, then this attack is considered
failed, the evaluated collapse time is considered infinite, and no
result is printed. The path-entrapment time represents the du-
ration between Tx and the first packet forwarded to any of the
intermediate attacking nodes (which, due to their RDA config-
uration, drop the packets instead of further forwarding them).
If no packets towards an attacked destination node could be
received by any of the attacking intermediate nodes, then this
duration is also considered infinite and no result is printed.
The DA path-collapse time and DA path-entrapment time
lines in Figure 6 show, depending on the length of the attacking
B path, the effect of an RDA attack (performed by all interme-
diate B-path nodes) on packets sent (by S ) to destination node
DA. The length of the alternative A path between S and DA
was configured to three, six, or nine hops, respectively, for Fig-
ure 6a, 6b, or 6c. The results show that attack is only possible
from nodes that are part of shortest path between a given source
and an attacked destination node. If the attack is possible, then
it succeeds immediately. However, whenever an existing non-
attacked path is shorter (or generally better) than the attacking
path, such as in 6a for a B-path length of three or more hops,
in 6b for a B-path length of six or more hops, or in 6c for a B-
path length of nine hops, then at least one of 5 observed attacks
failed.
As a double check, the DB path-collapse time and DB path-
entrapment time were measured to show the effect of all inter-
mediate A nodes attacking the routing towards destination node
DB (from the same source node S ) with converse results. For
the sake of brevity, these measurements are not shown here.
In summary, for DDA and RDA attacks, the most vulnera-
ble scenario for the attacked destination nodes is given if the
attacking nodes are in the advantageous position of a shorter or
better path.
A different effect can be seen if an attacking node combines
the DDA and RDA with the MMA attack as illustrated in Fig-
ure 7. For these measurements, only a single B node attacked
the packet delivery to DA. For Figure 7a, apart from only a
single attacking B node, the network scenario is equal to that
of Figure 6c. The combined attack on DA also succeeds with a
nine-hop B path that has the same length as the non-attacking
A path. This is because the attacking node manipulates the
distance-vector metric of the routing updates of DA to the best
possible value so that other nodes, receiving these updates, per-
ceive the path via the attacking node with a better path metric
than it actually has. This effect proves even more drastic in the
scenarios used for Figures 7b and 7c. In the former, DA is suc-
cessfully attacked by B8 for a B-path length between five and
nine hops. It should be noted that B8, in B-path lengths of five
to seven hops, is not on any reasonable path between S and DA.
In the case of the five-hop B path, it is actually three hops apart
from the shortest and correctly behaving path given by S -B5-
B4-B3-B2-DA and still succeeds in dropping routes redirected
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(c) Attack impact of B8 (9-hops B-path)
Figure 7: Performance of DDA&RDA&MMA-combined attack on DA node depending on A or B path length and adversary position
towards itself. That is because B5, which resides on the short-
est path, is closer to the MMA-attacking node B8 than to the
destination node DA and is affected by the promising updates
manipulated by B8. The same effect causes the successful at-
tacks shown in Figure 7c where the actual shortest path is given
by the varied A-path length, while the B path, where the at-
tacking B8 node resides, has been fixed to nine hops. Still, B
succeeds to attack DA even from a path that is up to six hops
longer than the alternative A path.
7.2.3. Recovery Functionality and Performance
In this section, we evaluate our SEMTOR implementation re-
garding its performance to recover, given that attacking nodes
have been identified, from the most critical combination of pre-
viously introduced attacks, by applying corrected trust sets that
exclude all adverse nodes.6
6Recovery performance could also be interpreted as the duration it takes to
effectively exclude a set of identified adversaries from the routing towards a
given destination node.
This attack combination is given if the adverse nodes are
placed in the advantageous position of a shorter path towards
the attacked destination node, are as close as possible to the
source node, and perform a combined DDA, RDA, and MMA
attack. Such a scenario is given for the transmission from S
to DA when attacked from B2 in the topology illustrated in
Figure 8. The topology extends that of Figure 5 with a third
group and path of neutral (correctly behaving) C nodes, which,
in its default configuration, corresponds (apart from the new C
nodes) with the scenario used for Figure 7a.
First, we deviate from this default configuration by varying
the path length of correct and non-correct (attacking) A and B
nodes. Later, the effect of an enabled neutral path length, as
given by the intermediate C nodes, is discussed in more detail
in section 7.2.4. To capture the recovery and convergence per-
formance of our implementation at the presence of lossy and
fading links, which must be expected for any realistic Wireless
Mesh Network (WMN) deployment, we also vary the broadcast
packet loss of configured links between 0% (corresponding to
perfect links) and up to 60%, using the Linux traffic control
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command mentioned earlier. However, the artificial loss is only
applied to broadcast transmissions that the SEMTOR protocol
uses for all its protocol data. All unicast transmissions along all
configured links are kept as loss free. This allows us to trace
the routing decisions of the protocol by capturing the path of
forwarded unicast packets, such as the ICMPv6 ping request,
and reply packets used for probing end-to-end packet delivery
between a given source-destination pair.
All B nodes perform combined DDA, RDA, and MMA at-
tacks to disrupt packet delivery to DA. In parallel, all A nodes
perform the same combination of attacks to disrupt packet de-
livery to DB. Moreover, C nodes perform no attacks and are not
attacked by any other node. The C nodes trust all other nodes
but are not trusted by any A or B nodes. The S node is used
as source node that sends packets to the destination nodes DA,
DB, and DC in parallel with the same parametrization as given
in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.
We measure path entrapment in the same way as performed
for Figures 6 and 7. However, once all attacked destination
routes are entrapped, we keep on running the emulation, wait
a random period between 40 and 60 seconds to let protocol in-
stances adapt to the given configuration, and then update the
trust sets of DA and DB so that DA does not trust B nodes any-
more (e.g., V tDA = {VDA,VA2,VA3,VA4,VA5,VA6,VA7,VA8,VA9})
and DB does not trust A nodes anymore (e.g., V tDB =
{VDB,VB2,VB3,VB4,VB5,VB6,VB7,VB8,VB9}). Note that neither
DA nor DB needs to trust S because, for this scenario, S is not
needed to relay packets from S to DA or DB (S creates and
sends packets but does not relay them). Furthermore, note that
the trust set V tS of S is irrelevant for the delivery of packets
sent by S . Such trust updates actually reflect a constellation
switch from Table 3 from b) to d). We then measure the elapsed
time from the moment of the updated trust sets until the last
packet from S to DA was routed via any B node and until the
last packet from S to DB was routed via any A node. Therefore,
tcpdump captures from the master switch, that covers all exist-
ing links, were searched for respective packets from S to DA,
DB, and DC that contained a MAC address from the deprecated
path. In the following figures, the average of these measures
are represented as path avoidance latency. We also measure
the elapsed time from the moment of the updated trust sets un-
til the first packet reaches the intended destination, which we
represent as path-recovery latency.
For the measurements shown in Figure 9, the following at-
tacks and links have been configured. From all optional S A
links, only the S A9 link is activated, which enables a nine-hop
A path between source node S and the destination nodes DA,
DB, and DC. From all optional S B links, only the S B2 link
is activated, which enables an alternative two-hop B path be-
tween S and DA, DB, and DC. None of the optional S C links
is activated so that no third alternative C path exists.
Moreover, Figure 9 indicates a clearly increasing entrapment
latency for the S -DB route, which is plausible given that rout-
ing updates from DB need to traverse several hops with in-
creasing packet loss before an MMA-modified update by any
A-path node could delude S to perceive the nine-hop A path as
shorter than the two-hop B path. The figure also shows that the
S − DA route is entrapped from the beginning, simply because
the shortest path already traversed B nodes even before these
started to attack the S − DA routing.
The recovery and avoidance latencies of the S − DA and
S − DB routes increase with increased protocol-data loss. The
avoidance of a deprecated path is achieved faster than the con-
vergence to the new trusted path. In the case of the S − DA
route, the average recovery increases to up to 40 seconds, which
is acceptable given that routing updates along the only trusted A
path need to propagate along nine links, each having a remain-
ing success rate for propagating broadcasted protocol messages
of only 40%.
7.2.4. Openness, decentrality, and cooperativeness
The attainment of further protocol objectives and desired
properties shall be illustrated with the measurements given in
Figure 10. The measurements represent the effect of path-
length variations based on the topology of Figure 8 which ex-
tends the default scenario used for Figure 9 by enabling a third
path of neutral C nodes. However, as a reference, the grey ver-
tical bar in each figure indicate measurements that can also be
found in Figure 9.
Autonomy, decentrality was demonstrated indirectly via all
performed experiments because none of the security enhance-
ments provided by the gained capability for recovering func-
tioning end-to-end routes required the existence of any central
authority or entity. Instead, all path selection were orchestrated
individually and autonomously via the trusted nodes definition
of each destination node.
Support for openness, neutrality, and cooperativeness, in the
sense that unknown nodes could join an existing network infras-
tructure and be neutrally supported without prior conditions,
could be well observed in Figures 10a and 10b, where the reach-
ability of the DC node from S is always provided, although no
C node is ever trusted by any A or B nodes and an alternative
S -DC path of intermediate C nodes does not exist in any of the
captured scenarios.
Our experiments also demonstrate how nodes benefit from
the existence of paths given by unknown (so non-trusted) but
correctly behaving nodes as seen from the measurements shown
in Figure 10c. Here, the existence of an alternative, although
non-trusted but shorter C path between S and DA, clearly re-
duces the avoidance latency with which the non-trusted and DA
attacking B-path nodes could be rendered as deprecated.
7.3. Validation of Resource Consumption and Scalability
To evaluate our design and implementation with respect to
its performance implications and our scalability objectives out-
lined in Section 3.1, the effect of network and protocol parame-
ters on total protocol overhead and performance has been mea-
sured by benchmarking our implementation on target given by
a cheap embedded device with hardware characteristics as sum-
marized in Table 6 and that can be considered the bottom end
of devices typically used within CNs [3, 5]. This device, run-
ning the Lede OS (an OpenWrt-based [101] Linux system) and
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Figure 8: Network topology for measuring path-recovery performance







































Figure 9: Path recovery latencies depending on average link loss
Table 6: HW and OS characteristics of the embedded target device
Characteristic Details
Type / CPU TP-Link TL-WR703N, Atheros AR7240@400 MHz
Wireless AR9331, 802.11bgn 150 Mbps @100 mW
Flash / Memory 4 MB / 32 MB
Ports 100 MBit Ethernet, USB 2.0
Power supply 5 V, 100 mA, 0.5 W
Cost approx 10 Euro (2013)
OS and distro Linux OpenWrt/Lede (lede-17.01)
Further reading http://wiki.openwrt.org/toh/tp-link/tl-wr703n
a cross-compiled version of our implementation, has been con-
nected as a core node via Ethernet to the virtual network en-
vironment explained in section 7.1. Figure 11 illustrates the
setup.
The overhead has been measured in terms of CPU usage
(relative to the totally available in the node), absolute virtual
memory usage (both using the Linux top command) and sent
protocol-data (using tcpdump) . Graphs in Figure 12 repre-
sent the results of these measurements averaged over 30 sec-
onds. To save space and ease comparability, CPU, memory,
and protocol-traffic overhead (node TX) are represented in a
single figure for each analyzed input parameter. All measure-
ments represent the overall resources consumed by the BMX7
process on the embedded target device and not just the extra
overhead added over the BMX6 implementation that was used
as a basis for integrating the SEMTOR mechanisms.
The effect of nodes updating their description at higher (non-
default) rates is illustrated in Figures 12b and 12e . The mea-
surements show that protocol-data overhead and CPU usage are
indeed significantly affected by such bootstrapping events and
that update intervals occurring at rates higher than once per sec-
ond have the potential to seriously harm the stability of the pro-
tocol, a finding that we will get back to later. To avoid capturing
the effect of parallel bootstrapping phases, an unlikely scenario
for real nodes under distributed administration, all other mea-
surements have been delayed for a stabilization period of 120
seconds after each protocol-configuration change.
From Figures 12a and 12d it can be seen that network size7
and number of links linearly affects CPU, memory, and traffic
usage per node.
CPU depending on network size rises slower than the oth-
ers which could be explained by the fact that the most CPU-
intensive operation of continuous signing and verification of
hello and routing-update messages could be significantly re-
duced with the symmetric DH2048-HMAC TX signatures
(compared with asymmetric RSA-based TX signatures evalu-
ated in [25]). Also, TX signatures are performed per packet
which can efficiently aggregate an increasing amount of mes-
sages.


















































(c) Performance vers. neutral path length
Figure 10: Path recovery performance depending on different physical path-lengths at 0% link loss
Figure 11: Experimentation setup consisting of benchmarked embedded router
and MLC-emulated network environment
Figure 12d shows that CPU and traffic overhead heavily de-
pend on the number of links to which the test node is ex-
posed, while little additional memory requirements could be
observed for maintaining an increasing number of links. This
could be explained with the relatively small related memory re-
quirements for maintaining these links compared to the allo-
cations needed for maintaining node descriptions and thereby
referenced data, which must be tracked anyway, also for non-
neighbouring nodes.
In addition, the following system characteristics were ob-
served with the objective to continuously validate the correct
operation of the embedded target device itself and the emula-
tion environment provided by the host (desktop) machine.
The fill rate (in 10%) of the TX-queue in the target device
that is used by our implementation to throttle (via increased ag-
gregation of scheduled messages) the transmission of protocol-
data packets was captured as TXQueue. The sharp increase of
the TX-queue fill rate in Figure 12e explains why the increase
of the protocol-data overhead declines in the same figure. Once
the fill rate reaches its maximum, scheduled messages are de-
layed for later aggregation, leading to less totally transmitted
but more efficiently aggregated packets.
The CPU load of the host machine (given in % as HostCPU,
relative to the total available processing capacity) was captured
(again using top command) with all four host CPU cores fixed
to their maximum frequency of 2.6 GHz.
The routing performance in terms of throughput (TP) for for-
warding user-data traffic, along SEMTOR-configured routes, in
and out of the target device was measured by conducting a TCP
TP test (using iperf) between the A1 LXC node, the first node
from the left in the top (A) row in Figure 11, to the A4 LXC node
(the fourth in the same row). In all topological setups, since the
target device was always linked to at least the nodes A1,A2,A3,
and A4 (the first four top left nodes), the best (shortest) path be-
tween A1 and A4 always consisted of only the target device as
the only intermediate hop. To ensure that only correctly routed
(along this best path) TCP traffic is considered, all TCP traffic
between A1 and A4 that was not routed back and forth via the
target device was dropped using iptables.
The measurements confirm that (i) user traffic is continuously
routed via the correct path and (ii) as long as the host CPU us-
age is below 50%, at the maximum speed that the 100 MBit
ethernet HW of the target device is capable of processing. In
fact, a clear relation can be seen between the host CPU load
and the TP, which degrades when the host CPU load exceeds
50% (e.g., Figures 12a , 12e ), while it appears uncorrelated
with the CPU or protocol-traffic increase of the target device
(e.g., Figures 12d , 12b ). We explain this with the incapability
of the Linux Kernel in the host machine to efficiently parallelize
layer-2 packet-forwarding tasks over its four cores. Therefore,
the observed degradation of routing performance can in fact be
attributed to a tentative overload of the host system which, by
emulating up to 200 nodes, is indeed challenged with an unre-
alistic setup.
The continuous lines for CPU, traffic, and memory overhead
in Figures 12a and 12d represent their increase based on a lin-
ear fitted model, fed with the obtained measurement averages.
This model has been used in Figures 12c and 12f for extrapo-
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(b) Ovhd. vs. own reconfigurations.
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(e) Ovhd. vs. others’ reconfigurations.
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(f) Expected ovhd. vs. CN densities
Figure 12: Measured and extrapolated overhead using DHM-packet signatures depending on network and protocol characteristics.
network scenarios and allows us to estimate the cost and limits
of SEMTOR when exposed to network scenarios known from
existing deployments. Therefore, the Y-axis represents in % a
given assumed resource availability. Regarding CPU and mem-
ory, the used embedded target device has served as a reference
for the available resources. Regarding resources for transmit-
ting protocol-data overhead, a link capacity of 1Mbit per sec-
ond has been assumed as a conservative but pragmatic upper
bound (100%) for the available capacity of a (typically wire-
less) link. The blue horizontal lines relate this assumptions
with link and path capacities known from existing wireless net-
work deployments [69] such as the average link TP reported by
Roofnet [96, 97] and the average and minimum end-to-end path
TP to GW nodes reported by QMPSU [5] and MadMesh [98]
which imply that each hop along these end-to-end pathes must
have had an at least equal but typically greater link capacity.
The gray vertical lines mark number of nodes and links per
node reported from same QMPSU and MadMesh deployments,
but also from GoogleWifi [99, 100] and from the Osona core
network, the largest zone in Guifi.net [71, 73, 4]. From this
comparison it can be seen that our SEMTOR/BMX7 implemen-
tation can be expected to well support existing deployment sce-
narios, generally without exhausting existing resources. Even
in the case of the 40-nodes Roofnet deployment (based on
rather outdated 80211b radio hardware combined with omni-
directinal antennas) the average reported link capacity of only
400kbps would not be exhausted unless the number of nodes
grow to about 800 nodes (20 times of its actual reported size
and assuming 15 instead of 10 average links per node).
In summary, since none of the observed performance degra-
dations can be attributed to the overload of the target device
itself, the measurements confirm the scalability of our imple-
mentation within the probed parameter space. Moreover, with
regards to the observed linearly increasing CPU, memory, and
protocol-data overhead depending on network size and den-
sity, the extrapolation of our measurements indicate that even
several-times larger networks with up to thousand of nodes and
tenths of links per node can be supported without exhausting
the processing resources of the used embedded device nor the
transmission capacities of wireless channels known from exist-
ing wireless network deployments.
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8. Open Issues and Adjacent Solutions
In the following, routing-security aspects are discussed in the
context of the objectives defined for this work and grouped into
(i) those out of the scope or not considered an attack (although
worth discussing), (ii) those addressed and explicitly handled,
and (iii) those remaining a potential threat.
Confidentiality attacks via eavesdropping of disseminated
protocol data fall into the first category. Such data includes
topology, trust, identity, and if published, personal information.
Particularly, the disclosure of trust sets has raised concerns, 8 as
its transparent dissemination allows others to deduce trust rela-
tions between the users of a CN and exploit this knowledge for
attacking individuals or groups of them in higher layers (e.g.,
the social layer). However, it should be noted that the pro-
vision of personal information via node descriptions or other
parallel infrastructure services is left to the preferences of each
node admin and could be omitted (thus revealing only trust rela-
tions between anonymous cryptographic identities) at the cost
of complicating the task for identifying the nodes considered
trustworthy.
Malign attacks also fall into this category, being the case
where a malicious node aims to influence the reputation of an-
other node by incorrectly reporting on its negative behaviour.
However, SEMTOR does not facilitate such attacks simply
because no functionality exists for detecting or reporting be-
haviour (good or bad) of other nodes.
This also means that selfish, non-cooperative, and unfair
behaviour is not considered by the protocol and (as yet) is left
to be solved independently. Here, approaches based on repu-
tation such as [34, 35] or observed traffic validation [64] and
distributed detection [68] mechanisms could be employed for
detecting (groups of) faulty nodes and adding them to the list of
non-trusted nodes.
However, with the support for verifiable and dynamically
updatable node descriptions, self-bootstrapping public-key in-
frastructure, and individually definable trust topology, powerful
tools are provided that can be used for arguing on the trustabil-
ity of nodes and enforcing individual decisions without requir-
ing consensus among network participants.
Several data-plane attacks, compromising confidentiality,
authenticity, integrity, non-replication, and non-repudiation of
user data are also considered out of the scope. Various exist-
ing and well-established end-to-end security solutions should
be used instead, such as TLS-based protocols like HTTPS, VPN
solutions like OpenVPN or tinc, and anonymization and privacy
protocols like TOR. In fact, the security aspects covered by our
protocol, operating on layer 3, complement these higher-layer
solutions, as these build on the availability of a functioning (al-
though best effort-based) routing and data-forwarding service
in the first place, partially for creating encrypted overlay net-
works on top of it. What these higher-layer security protocols
typically require are identity- and ownership-proven addresses
8For example, during discussions and presentations of our approach at com-
munity events, such as the International Summit for Community Wireless Net-
works 2013 and the Wireless Battle Mesh in Germany 2014 and Slovenia 2015.
and the availability of a functioning end-to-end packet delivery
along trusted paths established between nodes owning these ad-
dresses. Related guarantees should be provided by the control
plane, which can be attacked by disturbing the propagation of
node and topology information or the forwarding of data pack-
ets. Attacks on this plane from non-trusted nodes fall into the
second category, and preventing related attacks [27] (such as
blackhole, partition, detour, routing-table poisoning, imperson-
ation via replication, dropping, modification, or fabrication of
protocol messages) is what the main contribution of this work is
about. This is essentially achieved by excluding all non-trusted
nodes from related attack-susceptible tasks, such as route-
discovery, establishment, and forwarding. The key enablers
for this approach include the strictly non-overlapping receiver-
driven responsibility for these ‘trusted tasks’, the usage of a
permanent strong asymmetric-key pair (used for authenticating
node identity, cryptographically generated addresses ensuring
conflict-free IPv6 addresses and route ownership, trusted nodes,
and secondary-key replacements) and a secondary lightweight
key pair of which security relies on its short lifetime and fre-
quent replacement (used for frequent tasks of verifying com-
munication between neighbouring nodes and to identify and
discard data from non-trusted nodes).
Wormhole and denial of service (DoS) attacks fall into
the third category that remains unsolved with yet-to-be defined
mechanisms. While several approaches, such as TIK [80] using
packet leashes or NPA [81] observing the standard deviation of
round trip times, exist to defend against wormhole attacks, the
threat of DoS attacks on the security of mesh-routing protocols
has received much less attention.
The susceptibility to DoS attacks is actually a pillar stem-
ming from the open and decentralization objectives pursued
with our approach that provides no means for excluding ma-
licious or selfish nodes from exploiting or exhausting other
node resources. For example, an adversary can fake and propa-
gate large numbers of physically non-existent virtual node IDs
with frequently updated node descriptions that can hardly be
distinguished from real nodes but whose processing may eas-
ily exceed existing memory and CPU resources in real nodes.
The consequences of such attack could already be seen from
the measurements performed in Section 7.3, showing overhead
depending on the number of nodes or description update fre-
quency. To defend against such attacks without sacrificing
the decentralization and open preambles defined for this work,
nodes may prioritize the processing of certain known nodes and
throttle the support of the unknown, which is an approach we
plan to research further in future work.
The design in section 5 and experimental validation in sec-
tion 7 shows that it can safely separate trusted nodes from
the influence of non-trusted nodes. As illustrated in Figure 4,
when incorrect nodes are detected by any means, if these nodes
are not considered trusted anymore and tagged as non-trusted,
SEMTOR can render detected incorrect nodes harmless to the
network.
In summary, with respect to the design objectives in sec-
tion 3.1, SEMTOR can effectively ensure the ownership of data
traffic, forwarding routes and node identities, so that they can be
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attributed to exactly one node (ownership in objective 1). More-
over, it can ensure the ability to communicate by a contiguous
group of trusting nodes, never prevented by an external entity
(security as autonomy and robustness in objective 2). In addi-
tion it can ensure following an open and decentralized model,
where each node admin decides on the nodes to rely on (open-
ness and decentralization in objective 3). Finally, it can ensure
scalability (objective 4). Regarding the liveness properties, re-
sponsiveness is satisfied by the proactiveness of the protocol
and the progress as soon as correct messages with correct infor-
mation are delivered. Data delivery is satisfied according to the
conditions in the above paragraph, across trusted nodes that are
expected to be trustworthy (correct). The freshness and accu-
racy of the update and route information come by design of the
information ownership and security mechanisms, and the effi-
ciency of the protocol has been analyzed in detail in section 7.3.
Regarding the safety properties, the consistency and loop-
freedom are provided by the baseline routing algorithm that en-
sures route safety combined with the security and trust mecha-
nisms for node and path information (update safety). Adversary
freedom and adversary resilience come from the separation be-
tween trusted and non-trusted nodes, particularly when trusted
nodes are also trustworthy and incorrect nodes are or become
non-trusted when detected.
9. Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we pointed to new trust and security require-
ments arising in open and decentralized networks, such as CNs.
We described SEMTOR, a novel routing protocol that can be
used for satisfying these demands. Moreover, SEMTOR allows
the verifiable and undeniable definition and distributed appli-
cation of user-individual trust topologies for routing traffic to-
wards each node. One particular advantage of SEMTOR is that
it does not require a global consensus on the trustworthiness
of any node. This gives each node admin the freedom to in-
dividually define the subset (and resulting sub topology) from
the entire set of participating nodes that the admin considers
sufficiently trustworthy to meet the security and data-delivery
objectives and concerns.
Addressed security aspects have been discussed and put in
context with related and orthogonal security solutions and how
these can benefit by building on it. The proposed mechanisms
have been implemented, tested, and evaluated for their correct-
ness and performance to exclude non-trusted nodes from the
network. Therefore, safety and liveness properties that are guar-
anteed by our protocol have been identified and proven with for-
mal reasoning. The scalability of our implementation has been
evaluated regarding network size, density, reconfiguration dy-
namics, and strength of used crypto parameters. Measurement
results, obtained via benchmarking on low-end embedded hard-
ware, show scalability limits and parameters with significant
effects on performance and overhead. The results also show
that the usage of strong asymmetric cryptography for building
trusted routing topologies is possible, even given the scalability
requirements imposed by the environment and characteristics
of today’s CNs. In the future, we plan to research the effects
and challenges further due to the presence of large numbers of
anonymous nodes and DoS attacks.
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[68] E. López, L. Navarro, Kdet: Coordinated detection of forwarding faults
in wireless community networks, in: Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE
Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA - Volume 01, TRUSTCOM ’15, IEEE Com-
puter Society, Washington, DC, USA, 2015, pp. 734–741. doi:10.
1109/Trustcom.2015.441.
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